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Chapter 9
Longevity Risk and Annuities in Singapore
Joelle H.Y. Fong, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Benedict S.K. Koh
A central concern in the debate over pension reform in defined contribu-
tion (DC) systems is how plan participants should draw down their
accumulated asset balances during retirement. Annuitization is often
recommended as a means to help plan participants manage their longevity
risk, since otherwise they may outlive their assets in retirement. Some form
of annuitization in the payout phase helps ensure that plan participants
have a dependable flow of income beyond the retirement date all the way
to death. For instance, in the United Kingdom, retirees have been required
to use at least part of the lump-sum available at retirement to purchase an
annuity (Finkelstein and Poterba 2002, 2004); in Chile, the DC retirement
systems give plan members the choice of taking scheduled withdrawals or
buying life annuities upon retirement (Mitchell and Ruiz 2009).
This chapter reviews the nature of longevity risk and annuities in Singa-
pore in order to draw some implications about the prospects for future
annuitization under one of the world’s largest DC schemes, the Central
Provident Fund (CPF) of Singapore. In particular, we examine how the
current life annuity market appears to be operating and assess the likely
attractiveness of compulsory annuitization under proposed reforms.
In what follows, we first describe the way in which the retirement system
works in Singapore. Next we assess the value for money of existing annuity
products. We conclude with a brief discussion of the issues that arise when
discussing the options for a mandatory annuity model such as those recently
suggested in the Singaporean context.
The retirement framework in Singapore
Singapore’s CPF is one of Asia’s oldest retirement programs, as it was
established in 1955. Built around individual accounts, the scheme is manda-
tory and employment-linked. The current contribution rate under the DC
plan is divided between employers and employees; currently the total stands
at 34.5 percent (though it has been as high as 40 percent in the past).1
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Since inception, participants have been able to leave their contributions
with the CPF to earn a guaranteed risk-free interest rate (currently at least
2.5 percent [CPF 2009a]). The system has also been reformed several times
with the goal of enhancing the system’s asset accumulation by stimulating
more saving for retirement, housing, and health-care needs. The CPF
Investment Scheme, introduced in 1986 and broadened in 1993, allowed
pension contributions to be invested in mutual funds and alternative asset
classes including gold. In 1993 and again in 1996, CPF members were
permitted to buy shares of Singapore Telecom at a discount with their
CPF contributions.
The CPF Board, responsible for managing the system, has undertaken
a set of reforms focused on the asset decumulation process, responding in
part to the rapid aging of the CPF membership base. In the last 2 decades,
the proportion of members aged 55 and older experienced a fourfold
increase from 5.5 percent in 1985 to 22.9 percent in 2005; at the same
time, the proportion of those younger than 24 years fell from 25.1 percent
to 9.2 percent (CPF 2007a). This trend occurred, in part, because Singapore
has one of the world’s lowest fertility rates (1.29 per female) and longest
life expectancies (80.6 years at birth).2 These facts imply that retirement
expenses are projected to rise, as people live longer and have fewer children
on which to rely.
The CPF regulates how retirees can access their money via the so-called
Minimum Sum Scheme (MSS). This includes three main components: the
value of the Minimum Sum (MS), the age at which drawdown can start, and
the form of payouts. This scheme was introduced in 1987 to ensure that
CPF members could anticipate at least a basic standard of living in retire-
ment. At present, system participants at age 55 must set aside the MS in
their Retirement Account from their total accumulations;3 this amount is
then preserved and may be paid out only as of the official drawdown age.
In July 2007, for instance, the required MS was set at S$99,600 and the
official drawdown age at 62. The MS is not a threshold easily met; for
instance, only 36.4 percent of active members could set aside the required
MS in 2006 (CPF 2007b).
In response to the rapid aging of the CPF membership base and the
need to save more for retirement, the components have been fine-tuned.
Table 9.1 summarizes the evolution of the MSS and projected changes to
2013. Here we see that the stipulated MS rises progressively until it reaches
S$120,000 by 2013.4 Concurrently, the drawdown age is rising gradually
from 62 to 65 by 2018.
Retirees can currently take their payouts in the form of phased with-
drawals, though as of 2013, the government has announced there will be a
transition to a compulsory deferred annuitization format, which we discuss
later. Under the present rules, most retirees take drawdowns from their MS
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over about 20 years, or until the balance is exhausted. An alternative to this
phased withdrawal approach is a life annuity sold by private insurers.
In 2007, nine MSS annuities were offered; these involve a life annuity
where the lump-sum premium is the stipulated MS.5 These private insurers
tend to be well known in Singapore and international insurance markets
Table 9.1 Singapore’s Minimum Sum Scheme (MSS) schedule: 2003–13
Period Required
minimum
sum
(2003 S$)
Required
minimum
sum
(real S$)
Drawdown
age
MSS payout structure
2003 80,000 80,000 62  Default: phased withdrawal
(administered by CPF).
2004 84,000 84,500 62  Alternative: voluntary purchase of
annuities
2005 88,000 90,000 63 (choose fromMSS annuities offered
by private insurers. Starting from
2009, participants may also choose
from LIFE annuities).
2006 92,000 94,600 63
2007 96,000 99,600 64
2008 100,000 106,000 64
2009 104,000  65
2010 108,000  65
2011 112,000  65
2012 116,000  65
2013 120,000  65  Default: compulsory annuitization
(choose fromMSS annuities offered
by private insurers or LIFE annuities
offered by CPF).
 Alternative: nil.
Notes : As of 2003, the Minimum Sum (MS) will be raised from S$80,000 to S$120,000 by 2013
(in 2003 dollars) and adjusted for inflation. The drawdown age refers to the official age at
which the member may start drawing down the MS plus interest. For example, a member who
turns 55 on July 1, 2007 must set aside S$99,600 as the MS in his/her Retirement Account at
age 55 and may start draw down only when he/she reaches age 64. If he/she dies before
drawdown starts, the balance in the Retirement Account will be fully refunded to his/her
beneficiary. From 2003 to 2012, CPF is operating a voluntary annuity purchase scheme; life
annuities may be purchased with the MS voluntarily from qualifying annuities offered by
private insurers. Starting from 2009, participants may also choose from life annuities offered
by CPF. From 2013, CPF will operate a mandatory annuitization scheme with compulsory
purchase of life annuities using the MS; annuities will be offered by CPF-LIFE and private
insurers.
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Table 9.2 Monthly nominal payouts for life annuities purchased at the Minimum
Sum (MS) of S$99,600 (2007; S$ per month)
Monthly annuity payout
for entry age of 55
Company and product Male (S$) Female (S$) Guaranteed amount upon death
Nonparticipating Annuities
Asia Life Assurance 505.47 454.47 Premium  total annuity payments
Prudential Assurance 518.44 449.87 Premium  total annuity payments
American International
Assurance (AIA)
530.87 513.94 Premium  total annuity payments
Great Eastern Life (GE Life I) 535.35 484.30 Premium þ interest accumulated at
0.75% p.a. to age 62  total annuity
payments
Overseas Assurance
Corporation (OAC)
535.35 494.26 Premium þ interest accumulated at
0.75% p.a. to age 62  total annuity
payments
Aviva 559.00 507.00 Premium þ accrued interest
compounded at 1% p.a. to annuity
commencement date  total annuity
payments
Great Eastern Life (GE Life II)
(Note: This product includes
long-term care benefit.)
494.26 440.73 Premium þ interest accumulated at
0.5% p.a. to age 62  total annuity
payments
Subaverage 525.53 477.80
Participating Annuities
NTUC Income Co-op 523.50
(591.08a)
490.25
(557.83a)
Premium þ interest accumulated at
2.5% p.a. and bonuses to age 62  total
annuity payments
HSBC Insurance 474.00
(541.58a)
458.00
(525.58a)
Premium þ interest accumulated at 2%
p.a. to age 62  total annuity payments
Subaverage 498.75 474.13
Average without bonus
adjustment
519.58 476.98
Average with bonus
adjustment
534.60 492.00
a Bonus rates depend on company performance; NTUC Income’s annual bonus rates were 1–3.5 percent
historically; a 2 percent bonus is used in NTUC Income benefit illustrations. Original payouts without
bonus expressed without parentheses; figures in parentheses incorporate bonus component assuming an
annual projected bonus rate of 2 percent and a projected annual investment rate of return of 5 percent.
Notes: Monthly payouts for a nominal deferred annuity purchased at age 55 with payments starting at age 62.
The lump-sum premium is the MS of S$99,600 for members age 55 (July 07–June 08). Annuities under the
MSS currently guarantee a given amount in the event of annuitant’s death; the positive difference of the
guaranteed amount less annuity payments made would be paid to nominated beneficiaries. Previously (in
2000), most MS annuities were guaranteed for a certain period so if death occurred during the guaranteed
period, remaining annuity payments would be converted into a lump sum paid to beneficiaries.
Source: Authors’ calculations; derived from CPF (2008a).
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including American International Assurance (AIA), Prudential, and HSBC
Insurance, as well as some local insurance providers.
Table 9.2 summarizes attributes of the nine qualifying MS annuities
offered in 2007 by private insurers. There are some differences in provi-
sions, but the products offered are similar in that they are all single-
premium, deferred, life annuities. The lump-sum premium is the entire
MS amount of S$99,600 to be paid at age 55, in exchange for annuity
payments beginning at exactly age 62. All have fixed (level nominal) pay-
outs, with two annuities having an additional participating bonus feature;
these latter are not guaranteed and depend on the profits of the insurer
each year. Nonparticipating annuities payouts average S$526 per month
for males and S$478 for females, while participating payouts (minus the
bonus) average S$499 for males and S$474 for females. Participating pay-
outs are slightly lower since the consumer may receive bonus payouts on
top of the specified base rate. Overall, Table 9.2 shows that women receive
lower payouts for the same premium given their longer life expectancies; it
is also noteworthy that the annuity payouts are sex-specific, resulting in
females obtaining a lower annual payout than males for a given premium
(by contrast, the annual payouts under phased withdrawal are sex-neutral).
It is also worth noting that all MS annuities on offer include a ‘guaranteed
amount’ feature. Thus, at the annuitant’s death, his/her beneficiary receives
at least the premium paid (at least a premium of S$99,600)6 less annuity
payouts already made. In effect, this means that the protection has an
element of capital-protection on the premium remaining.
Despite the assortment of annuities available on the market, most CPF
retirees to date have elected phased withdrawal rather than life annuities.
While only 4–5 percent of the retiring cohorts in recent years have volun-
tarily purchased MS annuities, this small percentage must be evaluated in
the proper perspective. For one thing, about a quarter of the retiring
cohort was exempted due to medical grounds, small balances, or other
reasons. For another, almost half (48 percent) of the retirees were ineligi-
ble to buy this annuity because they had not set aside the full MS in cash;
this group is, by default, channeled into the phased withdrawal payout
option. In other words, of the remaining 27 percent who had a choice
between phased withdrawals versus lifetime annuity payouts, a relatively
high proportion – one out of six – opted for annuitization.7
This relatively high annuitization rate among the eligible compares to
much lower annuitization rates in other countries, where it has been
suggested that people may fail to annuitize because of crowd-out from
public defined benefit (DB) pensions, a desire to leave bequests, the
need for liquidity, and adverse selection, among other reasons (Mitchell
et al. 1999). In the Singaporean context, however, we can rule out the
crowd-out by a public DB pension as there is none. The bequest motive is
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unlikely to be a deterrent since existing rules permit bequests via refunds to
beneficiaries. More plausible is a desire for liquidity, since the phased
withdrawal approach yields monthly payouts of S$790, compared to the
average annuity payout of about S$520.8 It is plausible that myopic partici-
pants as well as those expecting to live a shorter period will opt for phased
withdrawal. Another factor may be inertia: pension plan participants are
often found to accept whatever is the default option, which in this case is a
phased withdrawal (Koh et al. 2008). The possibility of adverse selection
may also be a consideration in the Singaporean annuity market, though the
issue has not yet been fully evaluated. We turn to an examination of this
issue next.
Money’s worth valuation for Singaporean annuities
To examine the extent of adverse selection in the Singaporean voluntary
annuity market, it is necessary to compare the money’s worth of the life
annuity benefit using population survival versus annuitant tables. Specifi-
cally, we note that a life annuity is a contract that pays the buyer a benefit
as long as he/she lives, which insures the annuitant against the risk of
outliving accumulated resources, in exchange for a premium. By so
doing, the purchaser transfers his/her longevity risk to the insurer, who
pools the survival experience of multiple buyers. Following Mitchell et al.
(1999), the money’s worth ratio (MWR) is therefore the ratio of the
expected present discounted value (EPDV) of annuity payouts divided
by the initial premium (K):
MWR ¼ ½EPDVðbenefitsÞ=K ð9:1Þ
In the Singaporean context, K reflects the S$99,600 lump-sum premium
(the MS in 2007). The age of entry is age 55 when the annuity is purchased.
The general expression for the EPDV is as follows:
EPDV ¼
X1
t¼1
t pa  Aa
ð1þ it Þt ð9:2Þ
where a is the age at which the annuity is purchased, t represents the
number of months beyond annuity starting date, Aa refers to the (level or
fixed) monthly nominal annuity payout for the individual purchasing
annuity at age a, it is the nominal interest rate at month t, and tpa is the
probability of an individual of age a still surviving after t months. The
expression runs over the maximum life span in a given mortality table;
for a deferred annuity, payments Aa are zero during the deferred period.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/7/2010, SPi
Annuities in Singapore 161
Assuming no commercial costs (loads), actuarial fairness requires that
the discounted value of the annuity stream will equal the premium paid;
accordingly, the MWR for an actuarially fair annuity is unity. In practice,
two factors make annuities actuarially unfair for the average person. First,
insurers must charge enough to cover administrative costs and earn a
profit. Second, those who buy annuities tend to live longer than those
who do not. Accordingly, in a market where people buy annuities voluntar-
ily, this adverse selection raises prices for those who buy. As demonstrated
by Mitchell et al. (1999), one can separately value these two sources of
actuarial unfairness by comparing the difference in the MWR using the
population versus the annuitant survival tables. An appeal of the MWR
concept is that it is readily quantifiable and facilitates comparisons across
products and countries. Nevertheless, these calculations are necessarily
sensitive to underlying mortality and interest rate assumptions.
Prior studies on the Singaporean annuity market
Two studies have previously evaluated the money’s worth of MSS annuities
offered under the Singaporean system; both use data available in the year
2000.9 Fong (2002) investigates nine annuity products using a fixed inter-
est rate he proxies with the 10-year government bond yield. He reports a
mean MWR of 0.997 for the male population so his implied cost of adverse
selection is about 0.011. Doyle, Mitchell, and Piggott (2004) use five flat-
rate annuities and employ a term structure of interest rates that more
accurately discounts future cash flows. That analysis generates a slightly
lower MWR of 0.947 for the male population and a much lower cost of
adverse selection, 0.0026.
Both of these studies attribute the small degree of adverse selection
detected to the fact that the lack of a public DB pension system makes
the CPF annuitization scheme close to a ‘captive market.’ Yet there is
reason to worry that these money’s worth values could be overstated and
the degree of adverse selection biased down, due to the lack of good
mortality data. For instance, Doyle, Mitchell, and Piggott (2004) uses
abridged life tables from the World Health Organization,10 and Fong
(2002) extrapolates mortality patterns estimated from 1960 period life
tables. In addition, both studies assume a constant force of mortality for
fractional ages within a year without justifying why this might be appropri-
ate in the Singapore context.11 Another data limitation in past studies is
that their mortality tables have different limiting ages for the population
and the annuitant group. For instance, Fong (2002) assumed a maximum
life span of 99 years for the population but 109 years for the annuitant
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group; this naturally leads to higher MWRs for the annuitants. In what
follows, we seek to improve on these shortcomings.
Two other drawbacks of prior studies are worth noting. First, they use low
interest rates (long-duration T-bonds were not available at that time) that
may overstate the MWR results. The emergence of longer-duration bonds
offers us the opportunity to improve on this issue. And second, both studies
do not model the specific characteristics of the MSS annuities currently
offered. Specifically, they ignore the guarantee effective during the 7-year
deferral period and the lump-sum nature of the guarantee payments. That
is, they assume that CPF life annuities have two terms, where the first term
applies to the 15-year guarantee period, and the second term to the life
payout period thereafter:
EPDV ¼
X1512
t¼1
Aa
ð1þ it Þt
þ
X1
t¼181
t pa  Aa
ð1þ it Þt
ð9:3Þ
But Equation (9.3) does not capture the value of the refund if death occurs
prior to age 62,12 so it will understate the MWR. It also does not correctly
capture the fact that if death occurs during the 15-year guarantee period,
the refund is a lump-sum payment to the beneficiary minus payouts.
Our MWR equation extends the approach used in the past in four key
ways. First, we match the limiting age of the population group with that of
the annuitant group. Second, we include all the annuities currently on
offer under the CPF scheme, as opposed to selecting a subsample; we also
incorporate expected bonus payouts for participating annuities using his-
torical rates to reflect the participation upside on such products. Third, we
account for the guaranteed amount inherent in the 2007 MSS annuities
when undertaking the valuation analysis. Fourth, we apply a uniform
distribution of deaths assumption to better reflect the pattern of mortality
in Singapore.13
Adapting the valuation model for the joint-and-contingent annuity, and
using actuarial techniques to incorporate product-specific characteristics,
the following formula is then suitable for valuing a MS nominal annuity
with guaranteed amount refund:
EPDV ¼
X83
t¼1
ðt1Þ
pa  qaþðt1Þ  Gt
ð1þ it Þ t
þ
X1
t¼84
t pa  Aa þ ðt1Þpa  qaþðt1Þ max 0;Gt 
Xt84
s¼0
Aa;s
" #
ð1þ it Þ t
ð9:4Þ
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Here a, t, Aa, it, and tpa are defined as before, Gt is the guaranteed amount
(premium plus accrued interest) at time t, s is a counter for the number of
annuity payments made to annuitant before death, (t-1)pa is the probability
of an annuitant age a being alive after (t1) months, qaþ(t-1) is the proba-
bility of the annuitant age a þ (t1) months dying within the following
1 month. Taken together, (t1)pa · qaþ(t1) is the probability of an annu-
itant aged a surviving to (t1) months and then dying between month
(t1) and month t. Thus, this model extends Fong (2002) and Doyle,
Mitchell, and Piggott (2004) by explicitly including the refund upon
death before age 62 to represent expected benefits due to the annuitant
and his/her beneficiaries.14
In implementing this valuation, we are also fortunate to have access to
new population mortality tables recently published by Singapore Statistics
(SDOS 2008b) with a limiting age of 100. Building on this base, we then
must cohortize the population tables, as cohort mortality tables are not
available in Singapore to date. To derive birth cohort tables using period
life tables using the year 2007 period life table, we compute:
q^ xð2007þ t Þ ¼ qx ð2007Þ  ð1 ax Þt ð9:5Þ
where qx (2007) is the annual mortality rate for age x in year 2007,
q^ xð2007þ t Þ is the estimated annual mortality rate for age x in year
(2007þ t), and Æx represents the estimated annual mortality improvements
for an individual aged x extrapolated frommortality changes between 1990
and 2005. As in previous studies, mortality improvement rates are projected
from the abridged period population tables for Singapore published by the
World Health Organization. In addition, we match the limiting age of the
population group with that of the annuitant group by extrapolating popu-
lation mortality estimates to the common maximum age of 117 to properly
capture the longevity tail risk in the population group; this is particularly
important for females.
Little information is currently publicly available on the annuitant mor-
tality experience in Singapore. Standard insurance industry practice and
previous research (Fong 2002) adopted the UK annuitant mortality expe-
rience with adjustments for local conditions, similar to what is done in
Australia. Moreover, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), in its
capacity as insurance regulator, requires firms to employ the UK a(1990)
Ultimate Tables rated down 5 years for reserves and liability valuations
pertaining to annuities sold (MAS 2008a).15 Accordingly, we use the a
(1990) tables with a 5-year setback to estimate the annuitant experience
for our valuation year, and then we cohortize the resulting annuitant
tables.16
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Figure 9.1 Cumulative cohort survival probability: general population and annuitant
groups (conditional on attaining age 55 and limiting age of 117, 2007). Panel A:
Singaporean males. Panel B: Singaporean females. Source : Authors’ calculation;
see text.
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We compute cumulative survival probabilities from the cohort tables as
follows:
t pa ¼
Yt1
j¼0
ð1 qaþjÞ ð9:6Þ
where tpa is the cumulative probability of a person aged a surviving for
t years, and qaþj is the probability of a person age (a þ j) dying within the
year. These cumulative survival probabilities are sex-specific and calculated
on a monthly basis to match the frequency of the annuity payouts.
Figure 9.1 plots our estimates for the cumulative survival probabilities for
55-year-old males and females in Singapore, for the general population and
also for annuitants. The key takeaway from the figure is that the annuitant
survival curves lie above that of the general population, confirming that
cumulative survival probabilities for annuitants are generally higher than
those of the general population (or conversely, mortality for annuitants is
lower since they live longer).
Annuity quotes and interest rates
In 2007, eight private insurers offered life annuities under the MSS to
CPF members; they provided a total of nine qualifying annuities for the
MS premium of S$99,600 (CPF 2008a). All annuities paid level benefits;
two were also participating annuities (see Table 9.2). The NTUC Income
(2009) participating annuity offers an annual projected bonus rate of
about 2 percent; incorporating this rate for both participating annuities
means the average payout across all 2007 MSS annuities averages about
S$535 per month for a male participant and S$492 per month for a female
participant.
Data on interest rates are drawn from market information. As in
Mitchell et al. (1999), we use a term structure of interest rates to discount
the stream of annuity payments to the present. We judge the Singaporean
Treasury bond rates as appropriate here since the MSS annuities are
viewed as capital-protected and thus riskless. Relying on the prices and
yields of the Singapore Government Securities Treasury bonds at end
2007, we compute the riskless spot rates to proxy the yields on hypotheti-
cal zero coupon bonds.17 Table 9.3 summarizes the key inputs and
compares them to assumptions used in prior studies on Singaporean
annuities.
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MWRs for MSS annuities
We next provide money’s worth results using population mortality tables,
focusing on MSS life annuities offered by private insurers in the voluntary
annuity purchase scheme in 2007. Results in Table 9.4 show that, on
average, S$1 of premium spent on a nominal MS annuity by a 55-year-old
male drawn from the general population would generate nearly S$0.910 in
expected annuity income (in net present value terms). Likewise, a female
in the general population could anticipate receiving S$0.906. Though the
monthly payouts are lower for females than males, the MWR values con-
verge for both sexes, once life expectancy is taken in account. We also note
that NTUC Income annuity offered the highest money’s worth to retirees
in Singapore. The MWR of 1.006 (males) and 1.024 (females) exceeded
the average MWR by almost 10.5 percent and 13.1 percent, respectively.
Table 9.4 Money’s worth ratios (MWRs) and adverse selection cost of Minimum Sum Scheme
(MSS) annuities (nominal life annuities offered by private insurers under Central
Provident Fund (CPF) plan; 2007)
Male Female
Company and
product
Population
MWR
Annuitant
MWR
Adverse
selection (%)
Population
MWR
Annuitant
MWR
Adverse
selection (%)
Nonparticipating
annuity
Asia Life
Assurance
0.861 0.896 3.47 0.840 0.885 4.44
Prudential
Assurance
0.879 0.915 3.62 0.833 0.876 4.37
AIA 0.907 0.943 3.62 0.943 0.995 5.20
GE Life I 0.910 0.947 3.71 0.893 0.941 4.78
OAC 0.907 0.945 3.74 0.908 0.957 4.98
Aviva 0.943 0.982 3.98 0.930 0.981 5.14
GE Life II 0.846 0.879 3.34 0.818 0.860 4.22
Participating
annuity
NTUC Income
Co-op
1.006 1.047 4.09 1.024 1.081 5.61
HSBC Insurance 0.933 0.969 3.59 0.969 1.021 5.20
Mean 0.910 0.947 3.69 0.906 0.955 4.88
Notes: MWRs are in decimals. Adverse selection costs are in percentage points. Computations pertain to a
CPF participant who purchases the MSS annuity at entry age 55 for a premium of S$99,600, and starts
receiving payouts at age 62.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
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This could be explained by the fact that NTUC Income operates as a
cooperative company with a mission to give back 98 percent of profits to
policyholders in bonuses. Further, its monthly annuity payouts are the
highest among the MSS annuities (having factored in the estimated
bonus).18 Perhaps not surprisingly, this firm has the largest market share
of annuities in Singapore.
The MWR values may be used to estimate total loadings, which average
about 9.2 percent. These estimates are lower than those for UK nominal
annuities of about 14 percent (Finkelstein and Poterba 2002), and for US
annuities where the loads amount to about 15–20 percent (Mitchell et al.
1999). But the Singaporean results for 2007 are much higher than those
reported in previous studies on CPF-linked annuities using pricing from
earlier years and less precise mortality tables. That is, Fong (2002) reports
an average loading of only 1.4 percent for males and a negative loading for
females (MWR exceeded 1), while Doyle, Mitchell, and Piggott (2004)
found loadings of about 5.5 percent for both sexes. Such small loadings
make sense, given their very high MWR figures (0.945–1.009 using popula-
tion mortality). A possible explanation for the difference, as acknowledged
by the authors, is that their MWRs might be overstated due to the lack of
long duration Treasury bonds at the time. Their loading figures seem
implausibly low inasmuch as the products are mainly offered by private
insurers who could not survive for long if they paid such high benefits.
Our main explanations for the differences in the results are as follows:
 Different products evaluated: We value the MSS annuities offered in
2007, which include a guaranteed amount refund; earlier studies val-
ued the annuities with a 15-year guaranteed period.
 Different mortality assumptions: Prior studies employ a constant force
of mortality assumption for fractional ages within a year; by contrast,
we apply a uniform distribution of deaths assumption to better reflect
the pattern of mortality in Singapore.
 Higher premium and lower annuity payouts: Annuity quotes in the
year 2000 were based on a lower premium (S$65,000) and paid
out higher average monthly benefits (about S$555 for males; Doyle,
Mitchell, and Piggott 2004). By 2007, the premium had risen to S
$99,600 but the average annuity payouts were lower (S$520 for males).
Next we turn to a discussion of the cost of adverse selection. We compute
this by taking the difference between a given annuity’s MWR using annu-
itant mortality, versus the same product’s MW calculated using population
mortality. Table 9.4 shows that, on average, adverse selection costs are 3.69
percentage points for males and 4.88 percentage points for females. These
results are comparable to empirical findings in the United Kingdom where
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adverse selection costs amount to about 4.6 percentage points (Finkelstein
and Poterba 2002) and below the 6 percentage points reported for Austra-
lian annuities (Doyle, Mitchell, and Piggott 2004). They are much lower
than the 10 percentage points reported for the United States (Mitchell
et al. 1999).
Overall, our findings suggest that a retiree in Singapore’s CPF having
cash of at least the MS would have been able to purchase longevity protec-
tion on competitive terms, without much concern for adverse selection.
Total loads might be further reduced, of course, if annuitization were
mandatory, a topic to which we turn next.
Policy proposals for mandatory annuitization
Though the existing default phased withdrawal with voluntary annuitiza-
tion may have worked well in the past in Singapore, there is now concern
that future retirees may be at risk of running out of money. In 1990, for
instance, the average male and female life expectancy at birth was 73 and
77, respectively; by 2007, life expectancies at birth had risen to 78.2 and
82.9, respectively. And, of those aged 65 in 2007, two-thirds would expect to
still be alive at 80, and 48 percent at 85 (CPF 2007a). This means that about
half of all aged 65 CPF members alive today might outlive their CPF savings
under the 20-year phased withdrawal program (CPF 2009c). A related
concern is that the entire age structure of members has aged substantially,
while membership growth has tapered off. These factors are, quite sensibly,
turning policymaker’s attention to the role of longevity protection.
To this end, the Singapore Government has recently announced plans to
implement a mandatory annuitization scheme, slated to pay out benefits for
the first time in 2013. This program, dubbed the CPF-LIFE program, is being
integrated with the existing CPFMSS. At the time the plan was announced in
2007, a National Longevity Insurance Committee (NLIC) was formed to
help design the program’s elements (SPMO 2007). This group released a
report in 2008 outlining preliminary details and the design continues to be
refined. Accordingly, as of this writing, since only the broad outlines of the
new mandatory annuitization scheme are available, we do not offer MWR
computations; these must await more information of the product and pric-
ing structure of products to be offered. Nevertheless, the key elements of the
new proposal are usefully summarized.
The new scheme will automatically enroll members aged 51 and younger
from 2009 forward, who have at least S$40,000 cash saving in the Retire-
ment Account at age 55. The entity that supervises the current system,
the CPF Board, is to administer the scheme drawing on the advice of
independent actuarial consultants to determine premium and payout
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levels. Members may purchase their annuities either from a government-
administered entity, or from qualifying private insurers.
Key changes to be implemented under the LIFE scheme are later pay-
outs and a different default payout structure. Specifically, at age 55, a
participant must set aside a MS; in 2013, this is expected to be about S
$134,000 (CPF 2008b). Instead of having payouts begin at age 62, as now,
the MS is to be partially annuitized by default at age 65, so there is a 10-year
deferral period from age 55 to 65. The MS will be split into a term
component and an annuity component, with the split depending on
which plan the participant chooses. The term investment amount (T)
plus interest earned on T is intended to finance payouts from age 65 to
some older age (Y), where Ymay be elected by the participant within some
bounds (e.g., Ymight be either age 65, 75, or 85). The annuity component
(N) is intended to finance payouts from age Y to death. In any case,
however, the requirement is that the member must receive a fixed dollar
payout every month from age 65 to death as long as he/she lives; they can
also bequeath the term amount plus interest minus payouts. One other
decision to be made is whether the participant wishes to have his/her
remaining annuity premium (N minus payouts) provided to his/her heirs
on their death, which is called the ‘refund portion.’ For example, the R80
plan starts the annuity payout at age 80, and the annuity would have a
refund element; the NR65 plan starts the annuity payment at age 65 and
has no death benefit.
The rationale for making the system compulsory is to prevent adverse
selection, and it is logical to assume that making the program mandatory
will mitigate this problem. On the other hand, while the rules permit
members to elect either the CPF-managed annuity or a private annuity
provider, it is unclear whether private firms will be able to compete. There
is already some suggestion of a market response: in 2008, for instance, only
two MSS annuities were offered by private insurers, compared to nine the
previous year. The shrinkage of private annuity offerings could indicate
that private insurers are scrambling to reprice their products more com-
petitively, but it could also indicate that they have been crowded out more
permanently.
In the future, private annuity providers might instead refocus their
business outside the CPF scheme for those seeking to annuitize non-pen-
sion wealth. There is a cap to the amount in the Retirement Account that
CPF members can annuitize, namely, the stipulated MS that will rise over
time. Very wealthy individuals seeking a higher monthly annuity payout
would still turn to commercial annuities. It is also worth nothing that the
plan will exempt CPF members who hold alternative lifelong pensions or
receive annuities from the government-run annuity scheme.
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Conclusion
This chapter offers new evidence on the annuity market in Singapore
focusing on products offered by private insurers, and it discusses the
possible impact of imposing mandatory annuitization through the national
CPF system. We show that an average 55-year-old male could purchase
annuities providing a MWR value of about 0.910, using population tables;
this is similar to figures in other countries. But the costs of adverse selection
in Singapore are smaller than elsewhere, on the order of 0.3–5 percentage
points. Adverse selection accounts for 47 percent of total loadings; Brown
et al. (2001) by comparison found that roughly half of the cost of purchas-
ing a voluntary annuity in the US annuity market could be attributed to
adverse selection. What this means is that – given the best available data –
annuitization costs in Singapore are equally influenced by insurance com-
pany loadings and adverse selection.
For these reasons, we would expect that requiring mandatory annuitiza-
tion in Singapore is likely to have little impact on the money’s worth
valuations of lifetime annuity payouts due to the elimination of adverse
selection. Instead, what will enhance the value for money of annuity pay-
outs is the fact that the government will provide them, presumably without
the need to make a profit. To the extent that taking the CPF-provided
annuity is the default, this will likely hold down advertising, marketing, and
distribution costs as well. Accordingly, the entry of the CPF Board into the
market is expected to narrow the traditional gap between premiums and
anticipated benefits, and it will likely make the new payout products quite
attractive.
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Notes
1 For workers aged 50 and younger, the government has set the long-term target
CPF contribution rates at 30–36 percent, with an employee contribution of
20 percent and an employer contribution varying between 10 and 16 percent.
For those older than age 50 and up to 55, the long-term target range is set at
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24–30 percent, with the employee contribution at 18 percent and the employer
contribution varying between 6 and 12 percent (SPMO 2003).
2 Figures are from year-end 2007 and obtained from the Singapore Department
of Statistics (SDOS 2008a).
3 If a member’s total balance is higher than the MS, any remaining balance can be
withdrawn as a lump sum. If the total balance is less than the MS, the following
withdrawal rules currently apply for members who reach 55 between January 1,
2009 and June 30, 2009: total balance  S$5,000 (withdraw everything), S$5,000
< total balance  S$12,500 (withdraw S$5,000 and set aside remainder in Retire-
ment Account), and S$12,500 < total balance  S$176,667 (withdraw 40 percent
of total balance and set aside remainder in Retirement Account; see CPF 2009b).
4 This change was announced in 2003. The other two changes on the drawdown
age and payout structure were announced in 2007 in Prime Minister Lee’s
National Day Rally speech (SPMO 2007).
5 It must be noted that the CPF Board does not endorse any specific life annuity
product offered under the MSS nor does it screen private insurers (although any
life insurer exhibiting poor conduct or unacceptable behavior may have its
contract suspended).
6 In some products, the guaranteed amount is the premium plus annual interest
accrued from age 55 when the annuity is purchased up to age 62 when payouts
start; see Table 9.2. The results in Table 9.4 account for the different specifica-
tions of guaranteed amount for each product.
7 This is consistent with Doyle, Mitchell, and Piggott (2004).
8 This is for the case of a member who has set aside the full MS of S$99,600 at age
55 as of 2007. Under phased withdrawal, he/she can draw down this amount plus
interest via monthly payouts of S$790; of course, this will last for only about 20
years at which point the balance is likely to be exhausted.
9 A total of 11 flat-rate (level) nonparticipating and participating annuities were
offered in July 2000 (excludes two annuities with increasing payouts). Doyle,
Mitchell, and Piggott (2004) sampled five nonparticipating annuities. Fong
(2002) included all eight nonparticipating annuities plus one participating
annuity but did not incorporate potential bonus payouts from the participation
feature.
10 The World Health Organization (various years) offers abridged life tables that
provide mortality estimates in 5-year age intervals; they are less detailed than
complete life tables providing mortality rates for every individual age.
11 Three actuarial assumptions could be used for fractional ages within a year,
namely, a uniform distribution of deaths assumption, a constant force of mortal-
ity assumption, and a hyperbolic assumption.
12 In results not reported here, we find that 3–5 percent of EPDV is attributable to
refunds to the beneficiary upon the annuitant’s death (hence failure to capture
this understates the MWR by 3–5 percent).
13 The uniform distribution of deaths assumption for fractional ages within a year
is appropriate given the lack of variation in Singapore’s weather (so death rates
are unlikely to vary seasonally).
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14 This formula is appropriate for money’s worth values when the annuity has a
guaranteed amount or ‘capital-protection’ feature. Previous studies using US
data have focused on simpler products, mainly single-premium, immediate,
nominal annuities, and they differentiate between the single-life versus joint-
life annuities (see Mitchell et al. 1999; Brown et al. 2001). Studies on the UK
compulsory and voluntary annuity markets (Finkelstein and Poterba 2002) have
compared the money’s worth of nominal, real, and escalating annuities, some
with guarantee periods of 0, 5, and 10 years; these report that MWRs rise with the
length of the guarantee period. Thorburn, Rocha, and Morales (2005) report
that the MWRs of guaranteed annuities in Chile are smaller than those of non-
guaranteed annuities, possibly due to the fact that long periods of guarantee
tend to increase duration, thus reinvestment risk, forcing premiums up for a
given value of benefits.
15 The Sixth Schedule of the Insurance Regulations 2004 stipulates that insurersmay
employ the rates in the UK a(90) tables with a 5-year setback to value their annuity
liabilities. Previously, the InsuranceRegulations 1992 regulations required insurers
to employ the a(1990) tables with a 2-year setback. These a(1990) tables are
constructed based on UK annuitants’ mortality experience from 1967 to 1970
with mortality improvements projected to 1990. By applying the 5-year setback,
we effectively age the tables to year 2007 and then cohortize it for the MWRs.
16 As a robustness check, we verify that our calculations yield a lower mortality for
annuitant cohort than the population cohort; for instance, a 65-year-old male in
the general population has a mortality of 0.01133 compared to 0.01027 for an
annuitant, which seems reasonable.
17 The first-year rate is derived from the 1-year Treasury bill (MAS 2008b). There-
after, the 2-, 5-, 7-, 10-, 15- and 20-year Treasury bond rates as of 2007 are used to
estimate the riskless spot rates. Our annual spot rate ranges from 1.4 to 3.44
percent. Since maximum duration available is only 20 years, we then extrapolate
the last spot rate into the future, yielding a nominal riskless term structure of
interest rates on Singapore’s Treasury bonds.
18 Historically, NTUC Income’s average bonus participation rate has ranged be-
tween 1 and 3.5 percent, and a 2 percent future bonus rate is typically used to
value its annuity (NTUC Income 2009).
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